"Unlike the Arab nationalists, at the outset of the strike Jewish nationalists were blessed with an ongoing organization." The Jews were not "blessed" with an organisation, they created it and co-operated together. The Arabs could have done the same. "Monday, October 12, was the anniversary of Muhammad's journey to Jerusalem, a holy day." Muhammed did not go on a journey to Jerusalem. He either had a vision/dream/hallucination or he was magically transported from Mecca on a horse/human hybrid "Buraq."
"The intervention of the semi-independent Arab states marked a step toward Arab unity and as such constituted a diplomatic victory." - 'Arab Unity' was and still is a pipe-dream that has created problems whenever it has been attempted.

8. The Revolt of 1936: A Chronicle of Events - Barbara Kalkas

in Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, ed., The Transformation of Palestine

On the eve of the Arab rebellion the Arabs of Palestine were concerned less about latent cleavages between the two resident populations in their country than they were about the fulfillment of the Brit¬ ish promise of independence given, they believed, in the course of the First World War. Despite the progressive alienation of farm land to the various land funds, farmers had not attempted concerted political action to arrest the process. Despite dual pay scales-Jewish and "non-Jewish"- and ethnic quotas for many jobs, Arab workers for the most part avoided political articulation. Despite higher prices and unemployment following three years of record-breaking European immigration into Palestine, Palestinian ladies retained their chic Jewish dressmakers and continued to use European imports from the Jewish-owned retail stores which dotted Palestinian cities. Although Arabs recognized the connection between the economic problems facing their country and rampant immigration and land alienation, if they recognized a cleavage, this cleavage was between Palestinians and their colonial rulers-the British-not between Palestin¬ ians and the Zionists, who were seen as only secondary parties to the problem.

In the months preceding the 1936 rebellion, Palestinian Arabs were engaged in yet another attempt to attain political independence under provisions of the Palestine "Class-A" mandate. Late in the fall of 1934 another of the Arab delegations had approached the British high com¬ missioner, Lt. Gen. Sir Arthur Wauchope, requesting the formation of a Legislative Council as a first step toward Palestinian self-government envisioned in the mandate. A year later the delegation, called the United Front, again submitted its demands to Wauchope. Designed to alleviate

238

the "landless Arab" problem and to better regulate the flow of immigrants into the country, the so-called "November Demands" requested:

1. The establishment of democratic government in accordance with the Covenant of the League of Nations and Article 2 of the Palestine Mandate.

2. Prohibition of the transfer of Arab lands to Jews and the enactment of a law similar to the Five Faddan Law in Egypt.

3. (a) The immediate cessation of Jewish immigration and the forma¬ tion of a competent committee to determine the absorptive capacity of the country and lay down principles for immigration.

(b) Legislation to require all lawful residents to obtain and carry iden¬ tity cards.

(c) Immediate and effective investigation into illicit immigration.1

It was stressed that the first demand was the most important. Wauchope, who had been cooperating with the United Front, submitted his proposal for a Legislative Council to the Colonial Office in December, 1935.

The Zionist Organization had opposed the self-government scheme as early as November, 1934, insofar as a legislature might put the national home into question. Their suspicions were not entirely groundless, for under the proposed scheme the Legislative Council would ultimately control immigration and land sales, the building-blocks of the national home. Thus the Zionist Organization successfully blocked the measure in the British Parliament. Zionist opposition to the council was matched in part by that of a growing contingent of Arab militants who had become impatient with the failure of Arab diplomacy. Their feelings were not entirely groundless, insofar as the conservative, upper-class leadership had not gained any concession whatever from the British in thirteen years of on-and-off negotiations. The Jewish militants were similarly impatient, and several political assassinations of Zionist leaders, attributed to the Revision¬ ists, created fears in the "orthodox Zionist" community.

In the few months preceding the disturbances, fear and mutual distrust became increasingly apparent between the two communities. On October 16, 1935, an arms shipment destined for a Tel Aviv Jew and concealed in cement barrels was intercepted in the Jaffa port; the shipment was found

239

to contain 800 rifles and 400,000 cartridges. Many Palestinian Arabs, particularly members of the sizable petit bourgeoisie of Jaffa, staged a strike on October 26. They had called the work stoppage to draw attention specifically to what they believed to be the gradual arming of Jews in Palestine. In fact, Zionists suspected Arabs of the same activity, pointing to the program of the Holy Martyrs, a group of parapolitical religious- national revolutionaries. Accounts of the daring exploits of these rebels had been a regular feature of the Arab press, and the flair of the shaykh who headed the group, Shaykh Izz al-Din al-Qassam, led to his being cast as a romantic survival from the legendary past. In late November, British police had routed the revolutionary group near Jenin, killing the shaykh, and several of his followers. Remnants of the group reformed in the hills as the Holy Martyrs, proclaiming that they would collect money to buy arms to purge Palestine of alien influences (that is, British and Zionist). In mid-April of the following year, one of the isolated operations of these revolutionaries set off a wave of Jewish retaliation; Arab counter¬ retaliation eventually took the form of a general strike which lasted six months.2

The Outbreak of Violence

On the night of Wednesday, April 15, 1936, the Martyrs held up a convoy of ten cars traveling the Nablus-Tulkarm road and robbed the passengers. They escorted three of the Jewish passengers to the back of a truck and shot them. One was killed instantly, one later died of his wounds, and the third survived. The following night prowlers broke into the house of two orange-grove workers near Petah Tiqva, a Jewish settle¬ ment to the northeast of Tel Aviv. The intruders fatally shot the two Arab occupants of the house at close range in apparent reprisal for the Martyrs' murder of Jews the night before.

At noon the following day, services were held in Tel Aviv for the

240

Martyrs' victim. Although police had prohibited eulogies at the funeral, Tel Aviv municipal officials joined the crowds calling for vengeance: "We don't want this government; we want a Jewish army."3 This call triggered anti-Arab demonstrations in Tel Aviv which culminated in an attempted march on Jaffa, Tel Aviv's Arab counterpart to the south. Diverted by police and following calls from the crowd, the mob moved to the Tel Aviv City Hall, where more speeches were delivered. The police, having been attacked as they attempted to disperse the demonstrators, fought back and actually fired into the crowd. Four persons were shot and thirty beaten. To prevent further problems, authorities blocked off Allenby Square, and extra police were assigned, although Tel Aviv officials protested the pres¬ ence of "non-Jewish" (that is, British) police in their city.

Friday and Saturday, Jews in Tel Aviv picketed businesses which hired Arabs, and several Arabs were assaulted. The British government Palestine Report recorded some of these assaults, which occurred in Jaffa as well as in Tel Aviv, but added that "during the 17th and 18th of April no case of reprisal on the part of the Arabs was reported to the police."4 Wisely, the Arabs had been restrained, but they planned a demonstration for Sunday to protest events of the previous several days in the Tel Aviv area.

At nine o'clock Sunday morning (April 19), Arabs gathered in front of the Jaffa municipal offices while their leaders attempted to obtain a parade permit. Denied the permit, the gathering became a mob. Three Jews, one of whom was working in the area, were killed in the scuffle. The crowd moved toward the Tel Aviv road, hurling objects at cars and buses. Disorder continued until nightfall, by which time nine Jews and two Arabs had been killed and forty Jews and ten Arabs injured. Similar, though less bloody, demonstrations occurred simultaneously in Tulkarm and Nablus. During these disturbances the two Semitic populations in Palestine, already ideologically separable, began to separate spatially. The traditional Near Eastern mosaic pattern began to be rearranged, with even the ill-reputed Jaffa lightermen helping the majority of Jaffa's Jewish community to their Tel Aviv refuge. The populations were moving both ways; apparently it was obvious to them that the disturbances of the week¬ end would not subside immediately.

The high commissioner's reactions were more temperate. In a radio broadcast Sunday evening, Wauchope announced that he had put the 1931 Palestine (Defense) Orders-in-Council into effect. At first he applied these emergency regulations only in Jaffa and Tel Aviv, cordoning off these cities, regulating the sale of contraband, and imposing a curfew. Although

241

he did suspend certain civil rights, he did not declare martial law. The district commissioner of Tel Aviv, however, authorized the formation of a Jewish supernumerary force to protect the city, granting it permission to use arms already stored in Tel Aviv.

Incidents in Tel Aviv on Friday and Saturday dramatized to Arabs throughout Palestine the new-found confidence of the Zionists in their internationally protected status as members of the "national home." Palestinians were alarmed at the racial overtones of the recent events. They were being blatantly attacked by foreigners who were not only living in their country but were publicly stating their plans to take it over. Despite the unpopularity of the Legislative Council scheme itself, many Arabs resented its being shelved by Parliament. Now the foreigners were forming an army, sanctioned by the British authorities, who in the meantime were controlling their country. The refusal of authorities to grant a parade permit was the straw that broke the camel's back. Petitions to London had been ineffective, and protest was not allowed; the only course left was civil disobedience.

The Organization of the National Strike

Although the coordination of a single set of Arab demands to the British government and the complementary formation of an organization to articu¬ late these demands had begun by the time of the Jaffa riots, neither organi¬ zation nor demands were firmed-up until a week later. In fact, the final organization of the Arab strike and its overall process can be understood only in terms of contrapuntal movements among the Zionists, the author¬ ities, and the Palestinian Arabs between mid-April and the beginning of May. Arab leaders knew that the strike and disturbances were highly destructive to the national movement and at times wished that they could be stopped. Instead, actions of the authorities and the Zionists exacerbated Arab grievances at the grass roots. This led to a hardening of the line at the top, while simultaneously fostering dissension at the base of the national movement. The chronology of British, Zionist, and Arab moves during this period explains the closing of each side's ranks and subsequent altera¬ tion of each side's position vis-a-vis the others by the end of the strike.

From Sunday to Tuesday, April 19 to April 21, Arabs in almost every city in Palestine set up autonomous "national strike committees" in response to the Tel Aviv violence and official handling of it. Members of these committees were for the most part small businessmen and professionals, inexperienced in politics but shocked into action by the

242

Tel Aviv riots and assaults. While Arabs perceived this violence to be a result of British administration, their efforts to protest British policy were in no way concerted at this stage. Each committee had its own demands which centered around (but did not necessarily include and were not necessarily confined to) the limitation of immigration, the regulation of land sales, and the establishment of self-government in Palestine. The committees were formally united, and their demands regularized into a single program about a week after the Tel Aviv riots when the Supreme Arab Council (later called the Arab Higher Committee) was formed to coordinate the strike at the national level. The demands and strategy did not reach their final form until mid-May, long after most Arabs had originally assumed the strike would end.

The day after the Jaffa riot, Monday, April 20, community leaders in Jaffa met again with members of the Arab community there to discuss plans for protest of the incidents both in Tel Aviv and their own city. Like the ad hoc "national committee" meeting in Jerusalem on the same day, the Jaffa committee borrowed the demands and strategy formulated by the Tulkarm committee the day before. Assuming that the country could prosper only as a result of economic cooperation between the Muslim/Christian and Jewish communities, they decided as Arabs to boycott Jews until the Jewish community assented to the regulation of land sales and immigration in Palestine. All Arab shops would be closed, and no Arab was to perform his customarily low-cost services to Jews until an understanding was reached.

While the Nablus committee was similarly constituted and while it also employed the strike strategy, it adopted the United Front's November Demands to the British as its platform. Members incorporated the demand for a responsible national government in Palestine; they directed their grievances toward the authorities who fostered the national-home policy at the expense of the Arabs rather than toward the Jewish community as such. They protested the continued unregulated land sales and large- scale immigration which endangered Arab civil and national rights. The Nablus strike committee joined with the Palestine Arab Party in appealing to Syrian nationalists for support of their actions.

By Tuesday, April 21, Arabs in Gaza, Jenin, Hebron, and Haifa had set up committees and called strikes. The same day the United Front met in Jerusalem to reaffirm the demands of the Nablus committee. The following day it announced that it too would strike: the delegates postponed their trip to London until the strike was settled. In Jaffa, stores closed as a result of the Sunday riot remained closed, and by Tuesday the entire Arab sector of Palestine (with the possible exception of Haifa) was closed to business.

243

Peaceful civil disobedience had begun, but isolated violence continued and the government responded. On Monday, April 20, a group of three hundred Hourani migrant workers invaded several Jewish quarters in Jaffa and burned the Yemenite quarter to the ground. Five Jews and two Arabs were killed. Authorities divided the city into police districts, called for reinforcements, and rounded up all known Communists, who were adjudged responsible for the disturbances at this time. Fearing an Arab invasion of Jerusalem, authorities took similar measures there. Zionist officials reported to the district commissioner in Tel Aviv and were cautioned against arousing their followers. Wauchope summoned Arab leaders to his offices in Jerusalem, giving them similar advice. He suggested that if Arabs had complaints, these should be aired in London on the United Front's proposed trip. He added that the authorities could not be held responsible for injuries or deaths of persons involved in riots, and the following day notices to this effect were posted all over Palestine. Apparently the government was prepared to take full advantage of its avowed non-responsibility: as a result of a police charge on a riot in Jerusalem on Wednesday, the twenty-second, eight Arabs were killed and fifty-eight wounded.

While Arabs vainly attempted to amalgamate the scattered local committees on Tuesday the twenty-first, the Tel Aviv Executive Council (which had been meeting since the previous afternoon) issued a set of demands to the government. It wished the government to transfer its offices from Jaffa to Tel Aviv, and it requested that the authorities feed and provide land for the settlement of Jews who had sought safety in Tel Aviv. Some even wanted the declaration of martial law, but Wauchope counseled patience and reason, cautioning both Arab and Zionist leaders not to agitate their followers. On Wednesday, April 22, the high commissioner discussed with Tel Aviv leaders means by which the two hostile populations might be separated'and thus restrained from further confrontations. The London Times commented, "The question arises whether a permanent no-man's land shall be maintained between the two populations."5 Wednesday had passed relatively quietly in both Jaffa and Tel Aviv, but the following morning Mr. Thomas, the colonial secretary, echoed Wauchope's plea for a return to reason and order.

At this point Zionists brought the conflict into the international arena. Speaking before the First World Congress of Jewish Physicians meeting in Tel Aviv, Dr. Chaim Weizmann likened the Arab-Zionist hostilities to the struggle between barbarity and civilization. Noting Zionist dedication of purpose, he assured the physicians that civilization would not fall

244

to "the forces of destruction, the forces of the desert."6 David Ben-Gurion, then chairman of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, told leaders of the American Jewish community that the strike necessitated a vigorous campaign for increased immigration to Palestine. Zionist resolution would be made clear to the world, he said, and the Jews would prove that Palestine's economic absorptive capacity far outstripped that which the Arabs claimed. These statements provoked Palestinians to further political organization. The following day Sulayman Tuqan, mayor of Nablus, addressed representatives of about 30 villages in an organizational meeting called to refute Weizmann's and similar charges. Meetings were also held in Jenin and Tulkarm.

The authorities responded on April 24 by cutting telephone and telegraph communications between Palestine and surrounding states, explaining that this would inhibit activists' rumor-spreading; this action created, in effect, a news blackout on the Palestine situation. The govern¬ ment issued another warning to would-be rioters that the crowd-control police would be armed. If crowds attacked police or even refused to disperse on orders, the police were authorized to shoot. The next day police brought machine guns and armored cars into Tulkarm to control a demonstration there. Since the frightened crowd dispersed immediately, they did not use these weapons. Yet sporadic violence continued through¬ out the week. Arabs and Jews still stoned one another's motor vehicles, vandalism continued, and there were riots in major Arab cities. Support for the strike was growing, uniting disparate segments of the Arab population of Palestine. Several hundred veiled Muslim women staged a protest parade in Gaza on April 25, and on the same day the Haifa boatmen went on strike, despite the difficulties of organizing them previously.

Order emerged on April 25. At this time representatives of the six Arab national political parties in Palestine met in Jerusalem to establish the Supreme Arab Council. The coalition, later called the Arab Higher Committee, included the members of both the United Front and the Istiqlal (Independence) Party, which, up to then, had not been allied with the United Front. In a statement delivered to the high commissioner, the council adopted the November Demands of the United Front in a slightly altered form:

1. Stoppage of Jewish immigration.

2. Prohibition of land sales to Jews.

3. Formation of a national government responsible to the representative council.7

The third demand, calling for Palestinian independence, subsumed the other two, but the council indicated that they would accept a government statement that immigration would be suspended as a signal to begin negotiations to end the strike. The authorities were due to announce the Jewish labor quota for the next six-month period in several days.

The Supreme Arab Council was a coalition representing every faction of the Palestinian Arab bourgeoisie.8 Composed of mature men, some of whom had served in the Ottoman Parliament, the committee theoretically was to be the base of the proposed Palestinian Parliament. The committee members were nationalists, and the business of the coalition was to translate and direct Palestinian desperation into constructive political articulation through the language of nationalism. At the local level, most strikers were not politicized-this was the first time most strikers had attempted political action-and therein lay a weakness of the national movement. The committee members were moderates, if not conservatives, but they maintained a popular base by co-opting younger and more militant groups. Thus, as the strike progressed, the Arab demands were amended, and the original coalition was opened to include possible dissenters. In the process the Arab Higher Committee unified interest-based and regionally based national-strike committees into one, albeit loosely woven, organizational fabric. Finally, members of the coalition were experienced in negotiations with the British. Acting as a representative "government," the committee was responsible for negotiations with Great Britain and other governments. As a national government, the Arab Higher Committee succeeded; as the planning arm of a war of liberation it failed, but not by far.

The committee was able to unify disparate groups among Palestinians by acting as an intermediary to aid in the articulation of demands in a manner which the authorities would understand. For example, 25 Bedouin chiefs from Beersheba came to Jerusalem on April 29 to discuss a petition they intended to submit to the high commissioner. The petition had originally called for the cessation of immigration and land sales, but in the course of the discussion the Bedouins amended their statement to include the demand for a responsible government. While the committee coordinated the submission of demands, it imposed neither its form of demands nor its own ultimata on the various petitioners. Thus the committee let stand both the Bedouin demand that the government grant pardons to the imprisoned participants of demonstrations previous to 1936 and their threat to implement their demands themselves by force if the government failed to accede.

Hasan Sudqi Dajani, a Jerusalem municipal councilor, had been excluded from the Arab Higher Committee because of his presumed militance. He had organized the Motor Transport Strike Committee as an adjunct to the Arab Car Owners and Drivers Association, of which he was an officer. The Owners and Drivers were a unionlike organization of small capitalists who drove buses, taxis, and trucks, using chauffeuring fees to make payments on their vehicles. By late April the Motor Trans¬ port Strike Committee, headed by Dajani and Salah Abduh, had in¬ corporated the withholding of taxes in their ultimata. On May 1, Dajani issued a manifesto to the Arab people on behalf of his strike committee, calling for Arabs to withhold their taxes until the authorities agreed to limit immigration. By May 5, several national-strike committees had taken up the call. Here cleavages among strikers first appeared; some of the younger and more militant strikers were ready to condemn the Higher Committee for not taking more radical action.

The government ordinarily announced labor quotas around the first of May, but since the announcement had not yet been made on May 5, the Higher Committee issued another mild memorandum to the high com¬ missioner early that day. The members were summoned to Wauchope's office where he stated that he "was confident that none of you gentlemen associate yourselves with this [Dajani's] manifesto or any illegal act."9 He expressed the authorities' desire that the strike cease since it caused

247

"needless suffering,"10 and asked that the committee disband itself. He urged them to present their demands in London as planned. The committee responded that they would not leave Palestine until immigration was suspended; they would not stop protesting until the government gave some indication that it would negotiate the formation of a responsible national government.

The same day Dajani and Abduh were arrested. But at 5:30 that afternoon the Higher Committee issued a second memorandum to the high commissioner, this time incorporating the Motor Transport Strike Committee ultimatum on the withholding of taxes. The committee again stated that it would accept the cessation of immigration as an indication of the authorities' good faith and would stop the strike if immigration were suspended. In its memorandum the Higher Committee noted that the stoppage of immigration was far from unprecedented at times of disorder in Palestine:

The Arab people had hoped that the British Government would adopt a just policy and assist the Arabs in the realization of their [national] aspirations. But the Government had not even stopped Jewish immigration, as Sir Herbert Samuel and Sir John Chancellor did following the disturbances in 1921 and 1929.11

Although the younger militants saw this statement as unduly conservative, the British government regarded it as attempted blackmail. They explained that in addition to the constant reminders from the Jewish Agency, the Permanent Mandates Commission had recently expressed concern over the well-being of Jewish refugees from Germany.

But by May 7 the die had been cast. The Higher Committee called a meeting in Jerusalem of representatives of the various national-strike committees and the militants.12 The meeting of 150 representatives produced another memorandum for the high commissioner. More succinct than the last, it read:

The Conference unanimously resolves:

(i) That the Arab [Palestinian] Nation should continue the strike until the British Government introduces a basic change in its present policy which will manifest itself in the stoppage of Jewish immigration.

(ii) That the Arab Nation should refuse to pay taxes as from May 15, 1935, should the British Government fail to introduce a fundamental change in its policy which will manifest itself in the stoppage of Jewish immigration.13

This, the final manifesto of the Arab Higher Committee, put forth conditions for ending the strike. Stoppage of Jewish immigration (not necessarily the permanent stoppage) was not the primary Palestinian demand but rather a precondition for the strike's end. When the British government changed its pro-Zionist immigration policy, Arabs would abandon the strike and begin negotiations with the British on their previous demands, foremost among which was the establishment of a responsible national government.

Throughout May, group after group in Palestine voted to support the strike. Members of the Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce went on strike May 12. The All-Palestine Conference of Arab Students was organized in Jaffa on May 13. Their resolution included the three demands of the Higher Committee and the civil-disobedience ultimatum. Like the Bedouins in late April, they demanded the release of political prisoners jailed prior to 1936. They also demanded that the government nullify land transfers that had occurred in the last five years (since the John Hope Simpson Report), and that it repeal the collective-punishment ordinance. They even demanded that the Palestinian Boy Scouts be allowed to break off from the British association. On May 17 the Arab National Guard issued a proclamation urging universal support for the strike. The document called to the attention of conservative villagers that Great Britain was no longer a friend or protector of Islam, if in fact it ever had been. Palestinian resistance to British rule must persist, they said, even to the point of national self-extermination.14 The authorities confiscated the document the day it was issued.

Arab government officials increasingly showed support for the strike. Although they did not strike themselves, Arab police initiated a strike-relief fund early in June. Arab mayors meeting at Ramallah May 30 voted on whether they should call strikes of their municipal governments. The mayors of Jaffa, Nablus, Lydda, Ramie, Jenin, Tulkarm, Bethlehem, and Shefa'amr voted to strike as of June first. Mayors of Jerusalem, Acre,

249

Gaza, Safad, Majdal, Nazareth, Beersheba, Ramallah, Beit Jala, and Khan Younis voted to strike the next week if the government did not accede to the Higher Committee demands. These strikes went off as scheduled.

On June 30, one month after the mayors' meeting, 137 Arab senior officials submitted a memorandum to the government indicating their endorsement of the Palestinian demands and urging the government to follow suit. In July, 1,200 second-division Arab civil servants presented a similar memorandum. From mid-June on, Palestinian Muslims had criticized al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni for not encouraging officials of the Muslim religious courts to strike. Though they did not strike, they pre¬ sented a memorandum to the government in July, reminding the "British officials of the revenge of God the Almighty."15

As Palestinian unity behind the demands developed, so did foreign sympathy for Palestinians. Middle Eastern and American Arabs, Christian missionaries, and public figures far removed from either Palestine or the Arab world, including Pandit Nehru, issued statements sympathetic to the Palestinians. The prime minister of Egypt, Nahhas Pasha, and the rector of al-Azhar led Egyptians in a fund drive which collected more than £E 12,000 to support the strikers. This support was by no means overwhelming, but it represented the first large-scale support ever given to Palestinians in their quest for self-determination.

The Government Responds: Use of Civil Powers

Although the authorities were never tolerant of the disorders, their actions to put them down became increasingly drastic as the strike pro¬ ceeded. This was particularly true following the Arab memorandum concerning the nonpayment of taxes. Reluctant to resort to force of arms in what was essentially a political matter, Wauchope attempted to repress dissent under provisions of Palestinian civil law and the 1931 Palestine (Defense) Orders-in-Council. As disturbances continued, the authorities' powers were extended through successive amendments of these emergency regulations. Mass arrests, collective fines, and demolitions were charac¬ teristic of government actions at this time. By midsummer the courts were questioning the legality of these government actions.

250

Under Palestinian civil law, the high commissioner had the power to suspend newspapers, arrest agitators, and levy collective fines on villages and quarters of cities in violation of the law. In times of civil disorder the high commissioner could also invoke provisions of the 1931 Palestine (Defense) Orders-in-Council. These laws empowered him to impose censorship and curfews, authorize searches and seizures without a warrant, and regulate the sale of contraband. The night following the Jaffa riots these regulations were put into force. A month later, on May 22, the regulations were amended to authorize the detention of persons suspected of illegal actions. On June 2, the strike was declared illegal. Two days later, the regulations were again amended to authorize forced opening of businesses and detention of strikers in camps.

At the outset of disturbances the authorities had assumed that the Arab masses were still loyal and that Fascist and Communist propagandists were responsible for Arab anti-British sentiment. In view of this, the authorities hoped that arrest and detention of such agitators would curtail the disturbances. In the several days preceding May Day, police arrested all known Communists in Palestine (the group included 15 Arabs and 66 Jews). Despite these preparations, May Day did not go quietly. A Haifa demonstration of 2,000 persons turned into a riot when the crowd attacked the police. The police fired into the crowd, killing 2 Arabs and injuring 15. There were similar demonstrations in other Arab cities. In all these and in the subsequent framing of the Arab demands, youthful Arab nationalists played decisive roles. Thus the attention of the government turned to the "youthful militant."

The government made its first arrests of members of the resistance when, after several local national-strike committees had adopted the nonpayment of taxes provision of the Motor Transport Strike Committee manifesto issued May 1, the authors of the manifesto, Salah Abduh and Hasan Sudqi Dajani, were detained. By May 13, over 600 persons (mostly Arabs) had been arrested as a result of the disturbances. On May 23, following the Higher Committee's rejection of the Royal Commission, Wauchope authorized the arrest of 61 Arab "agitators," among whom were 40 heads of local national-strike committees. The next day Dajani was arrested a second time, along with four Arab journalists whose papers had published the Higher Committee's manifesto. Others, including Fakhri Nashashibi, were required to report to Jerusalem authorities three times daily.

By the beginning of June the authorities had transformed the Royal Air Force billet near Jaffa at Sarafand into a new concentration camp. The other camp at Auja al-Hafir was so full that it could not accommodate any more prisoners. Later it was explained that Sarafand was more

251

accessible than the other camp, which was located in the Sinai. By the beginning of June, 37 more leaders had been sent to Sarafand, including Awni Abdul Hadi of the Higher Committee and Asem Sa'id, Jaffa's 70-year-old mayor. On June 19 Mr. Ormsby-Gore announced that 2,598 persons had been arrested in Palestine as a result of the strike. Of the 1,823 Arabs who had been tried, 1,206 had been convicted; another 281 awaited trial. Of the 418 Jews who had been tried, 328 had been con¬ victed; 76 more awaited trial. By the nineteenth, 81 Arab leaders had been imprisoned at Sarafand. At least 122 other leaders were under suspicion at that time, "most of whom [were] to be deported to Sarafand within the week."16 By the end of the disturbances these figures must have increased considerably; official figures, however, are not consistent. At one point during the strike more than 400 leaders of strike committees were in prison;17 yet without these leaders the strike continued.

Failing arrests, the high commissioner still had the power under civil law to impose collective fines on settlements. This power was said to be based on historical Ottoman prerogatives. The authorities' resurrection of these antique laws (dating back to the barter economy) occasioned jokes among the Arabs. Early in May the authorities announced that collective fines would be levied against villages and towns where resistance was encountered. The collection of fines began in mid-May in the northern district with government confiscation of 193 houses as punitive fines. On June 12, public laws concerning the imposition of these fines were augmented by new emergency regulations, and by mid-July fines had been levied on most major Arab settlements. Apparently the collec¬ tions were made routinely until July 23, when Gaza officials made an appeal to the Palestine Supreme Court to set aside its £P 1,000 fine. The city was being punished for sabotage of railways and telephone lines in the area.

On July 31, Judges McDonnell and Manning ruled that the emergency regulations of June 12 were not constitutional insofar as they were not subject to appeal by the victims. Furthermore, the chief justice, Mr. McDonnell, censured procedures by which officials took their actions. An unauthorized person-the assistant district commissioner-had authorized the fine. Regulations did not allow for levying fines in cash; rather they had to be levied in kind. Finally the regulations were not retroactive, and the Gaza fine, levied for sabotage which took place before the regulations were enacted, was set aside. The court urged the authorities to restrain their applications of emergency measures. It was assumed that the judg¬ ment would annul similar fines on other cities. On August 1, another collective-fines ordinance was published; this one was retroactive to April 19 and allowed the payment of fines in cash. By September 14, fines equaling $90,000 had been levied in 28 towns-yet rural resistance continued unabated.

It was suggested on May 28 that the rural area surrounding Nablus, a stronghold of resistance to the collection of punitive fines, be evacuated of civilians and bombed. This action was not taken in Nablus, but a similar strategy was suggested for the city of Jaffa. Throughout the strike the old city of Jaffa had been entirely outside government control. The old quarter of Jaffa offered special problems to the authorities. Built on a mountainous promontory overlooking the harbor, the walled quarter was an impenetrable fortress. The strike had begun in Jaffa, and militant youth there were encouraged by the Jaffa boatmen, who lived mainly in the old city. A haven for snipers and manufacturers of homemade bombs, Jaffa could not be patrolled on foot. The narrow streets, so steep that in places they were constructed as stairways, prevented the use by police of armored motor vehicles. In early June police had considered sealing the city with barbed-wire barricades, placing it under seige.

Royal Air Force planes traveling over Jaffa on June 16 dropped leaflets into the old city announcing to residents the government's intention to execute a sweeping "urban-renewal" program there. The work would begin immediately since a corps of Royal Engineers happened to be in Palestine at the time. Most of the old city would be demolished, ridding the place of congested and unsanitary housing, all for the benefit of the inhabitants. Two wide boulevards, flanked with spacious, modern build¬ ings, were to be cut through the old quarter in the direction of the Jaffa port. Residents questioned the government's sudden philanthropy, sug¬ gesting that the demolition of their quarter was a military rather than town-planning effort.

Although demolition had been scheduled to begin June 16, the govern¬ ment delayed work two days while it considered the fate of a small mosque in the path of destruction. Meanwhile, residents were forced to evacuate

253

the quarter, most of them to take up housekeeping in orange groves to the east of the city. The government planned to compensate the 6,000 displaced persons at the rate of 20 mils (five English pence) per person per week, and some persons were even given shelter in public buildings. By five o'clock on the morning of June 18 the city had been searched and sealed, and police were stationed at all gates. In the next few days structures were blown up, cluster by cluster, layer by layer. The London Times reported that by Sunday, June 21, the demolition deemed necessary by the town-planning effort had been accomplished. The Hourani quarter and much of Jaffa's old city had been eliminated.18

On June 26 the government circulated a second batch of notices:

In accordance with the scheme for opening up the Old City of Jaffa your house may be demolished.

You are therefore required to vacate it before 7 p.m. on Sunday 28th June, 1936.

No claim for compensation in respect of furniture or effects left in your house after that hour will be considered.19

On June 27 several homeowners filed motions with the Palestine Supreme Court to protest this measure. On July 1, Mr. Ormsby-Gore announced in Parliament that the demolition was necessary for the defense of Palestine. One case came to court July 3, after the owner's house had been demol¬ ished. The chief justice, Mr. McDonnell, and the senior puisne judge, Mr. Manning, ruled first that the government ought to have made clear that the demolition had been necessitated by the military emergency in Palestine, not town-planning as the government had claimed (the English phrase "scheme for opening up" had misleadingly been rendered "town-planning scheme" in Arabic); second, that the legal provision under which such demolition was to take place allowed the authorities to "pull down" structures in accordance with normal wrecking procedures but not to blow them up with dynamite; third, that although only the Jaffa district commissioner had the power to authorize such "pulling down," this official claimed he had not authorized the action (in fact, no leaflets or papers showered on, or served on, Jaffa residents were signed by any government official, nor was it even indicated which office had sent them

254

out); fourth, that the government was bound to make full compensation for damages whether or not effects had been removed by the appointed hour; and finally, that some of the houses demolished, including the house in question, were not even sited on parcels destined for "renewal." Thus, while the court did not overrule the government's action, it did severely censure the means by which it was taken and waived court costs for the petitioner.

Efforts to Mediate: Arab-British Deadlock

Whereas in May the Higher Committee followed the precedent set by the United Front, confining negotiations to Palestine and negotiating func¬ tions to Palestinians, in June and the months following the most important negotiations either took place outside Palestine or utilized services of non-Palestinians. From late June through mid-July representatives of the Higher Committee traveled from capital to capital, concentrating their efforts in London. The Higher Committee's May 7 manifesto had set the stoppage of immigration as a signal to end the strike and begin negotia¬ tions on the national demands. The authorities, however, called for an end to the strike as a signal for an inquiry into Arab grievances, foremost among which they understood to be the insufficient restriction of im¬ migration. This deadlock continued until late August when mediation efforts of the Iraqi foreign minister showed signs of success.

A few days before the announcement of the labor quota, the high commissioner stated that the government would appoint a royal com¬ mission to investigate the merits of the Palestinian case. On May 18 he announced the quota. The 4,500 certificates allotted (4,000 to the Jewish Agency and 500 to the government department of immigration) represented a dramatic increase20 over the 3,250 certificates issued in the previous six-month period. The official London announcement of the royal commission was made the same day. Two days later, on May 20, the Arab Higher Committee issued a proclamation indicating that it would not accept the appointment of another commission in lieu of government stoppage of immigration. Had the authorities only followed recommenda¬ tions of the previous commissions, that is, limited immigration, regulated

255

land sales, and established a responsible national government, Arabs would not have gone on strike in the first place. If the authorities agreed to follow only the recommendation regarding immigration, the Higher Committee would call off the strike and commence negotiations on the national demands. Instead of a British commission, it suggested another international inquiry into the mandate. It also recommended that a plebiscite be held to decide whether the mandate should be continued.21

Concurrent with their official rejection on May 28 of the proposed royal commission, the Higher Committee cabled the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission to ask for an official investigation of the Palestine disturbances. These began immediately. Mr. H. H. Trusted appeared as the British delegate during the first ten days of June. He said little, explained nothing, and the League did nothing. During the inquiry it became clear that he was not entirely familiar with events in Palestine. Anyone having acquaintance with the subject was in Palestine or London attempting to deal with it. The official explanation of British intransigence ran that the chairman of the commission was Italian and was thus considered a belligerent in the Palestine disturbances (the current British explanation of the strike was that it had been brought on by Italian propaganda).

Meanwhile the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland filed a statement with the League commission, holding that an inquiry was unnecessary and that the "Arab attitude" during the strike demonstrated their unreadiness for self-government. They demanded not only a larger

256

volume of immigration into Palestine but also an extension of the national home into Transjordan. The Permanent Mandates Commission inquiry was resumed in late August, with the British still refusing to make an official statement until the Peel Commission made its inquiry. The League could not act on petitions it received until Britain made an official state¬ ment. It did not discuss the 1936 disturbances until its 32nd session in the summer of 1937.

At the end of May and beginning of June the Higher Committee engaged in intensive talks with the high commissioner. On June 3, the high commissioner flew to Amman to discuss the situation with Amir Abdullah of Transjordan. The New York Times speculated that Abdullah, as the most vulnerable Arab statesman, might make an easy ally in negotiations. As the principal exponent of a "Greater Syria," a united Arab state, Abdullah and his vision might be made to work for Britain. Speculation ran high that the disorders would soon spread from Palestine into Transjordan, and the amir was already having trouble with his Bedouins. But he replied that he would be unable to act as an intermediary unless empowered to make certain concessions to the Higher Committee. Wauchope flew back to Jerusalem June 6.

On June 7, al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni, Mayor Khalidi, Awni Abdul Hadi, and two others flew to Amman to confer with Abdullah. On their return the same day, Awni Abdul Hadi was arrested. Baiting the high commissioner, the mufti, al-Hajj Amin, reportedly informed Sir Arthur that the only solution that the Arabs would accept would be that the Jews in Palestine who entered the country since the World War should be sent out. Arabs would then buy land with funds from "Palestine Tickets."22

The joke ran that if Zionists could colonize Palestine, displacing Arabs, why couldn't Arabs launch a bond drive for the recolonization of their country? If Arab civil rights were unimportant to the authorities, the rights of the Zionists ought not to be important either. Several Arab newspapers had in the meantime printed rumors that the government was ready to concede on immigration. On June 9, Wauchope suspended these news¬ papers, denying that the authorities would concede anything. The Higher Committee's statement issued the same day declared that negotiations were impossible at the time, as the government's actions precluded them.

In a statement before the Supply Committee on June 19, the colonial secretary, Mr. Ormsby-Gore, reaffirmed the British position on continued immigration and British commitment to the national-home policy. On June 29, the Higher Committee answered the colonial secretary. They particularly stressed that a national government responsible to all segments of the Palestine population must be established. They further suggested that Zionist plans endangered the Muslim Holy Places in Jerusalem, particularly the Haram al-Sharif. Finally they protested the "use of armed forces against an unarmed people."23 The Arabs and British were talking past each other.

On July 13, Wauchope again went to Amman to confer with Abdullah. In view of the deadlock, the Associated Press asked Abdullah whether he would mediate to end the strike even if the authorities refused to concede on immigration. He answered:

No, we cannot interfere. … But a man does not hate himself. And all Arabs will hold on with their teeth until the British Government realizes the justice of Arabian claims for independence, economic security, freedom from the rising tide of Jews who have smothered the Palestinian Arab by absorbing his land. If there had been no Balfour Declaration, Jews would have come under an Arabian Government in Palestine. They would have been welcome.

The interview also contained the first public statement on what concession on immigration would be considered an acceptable invitation to negotiations on the national demands.

Now to find any solution, Jewish immigration must be limited to 30% of the present Jewish population if any room is to be left at all for the Arabs.24

Meanwhile, early in June several representatives of the Higher Com¬ mittee had departed from Palestine to make the circuit of foreign capitals. On July 2, the delegation presented the Palestinian case in full to about one hundred members of Parliament. Several days later they set up an Arab information office in London. On July 14 the delegation met with Mr. Ormsby-Gore to present their interpretation of the events in Palestine. On July 20, Ormsby-Gore announced the membership of the royal com¬ mission of inquiry, but did not release the terms of inquiry until several days later. Since the members of the commission were experienced in

258

colonial affairs, the Arabs were encouraged that the terms of inquiry would be favorable. By July 25, the deadlock in negotiations was obvious, and the Higher Committee met in Jerusalem to discuss strategy. The members decided that they would cooperate with the commission if its terms of inquiry allowed negotiations on their national demands. Awni Abdul Hadi, imprisoned at Sarafand, had a letter smuggled to al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni suggesting that Arabs boycott the commission if its terms kept negotiations within the framework of the mandate and pre¬ cluded negotiations on their national demands.

On July 27, the one hundredth day of the strike, the Higher Committee issued a congratulatory statement to strikers and appealed for support from non-Palestinians. The day was proclaimed a national day of prayer. It was rumored that London was prepared to enter negotiations. But on July 29 Mr. Ormsby-Gore announced that the commission's inquiry would be bound by the terms of the mandate; the New York Times recorded that while Arabs were disappointed, "Jews were not displeased."25 On August 1, there was a meeting in Jerusalem of unidentified members of the Arab elite. As usual it was reported that enthusiasm for the strike had waned, and the leaders wanted out.

On July 23, however, Abdullah had extended another invitation to the Higher Committee to come to Amman, and the committee had accepted. It was assumed that Abdullah would convince the British to make conces¬ sions on the terms of inquiry and that the Palestinians would accept the new terms and call off the strike. The question remained whether the mili¬ tants would accept the plan. On August 4 a party of 26 Palestinians, in¬ cluding the Higher Committee and interested mayors, met with Abdullah in Amman to discuss the acceptance of the royal commission. By August 7 it was known that Abdullah had stressed that the British would ultimately stop the strike with brute force regardless of the justice of the Palestinian demands. He suggested that the committee call off the strike unilaterally. In return, the committee could count on his efforts to achieve concessions.

On August 8 it was rumored that Abdullah's mediation attempt had not worked. By August 11 the Higher Committee issued another procla¬ mation condemning the terms of inquiry and stressing that Palestinian independence was long overdue. Although the Higher Committee also called a congress of representatives of local national-strike committees to meet in Jerusalem August 20 to discuss Abdullah's offer, by August 15 newspapers printing explanations of Abdullah's proposal were publicly burned. On August 17 two Jewish nurses were murdered in Jaffa, and, as a result, the authorities extended the Jaffa curfew to 21 hours and pro¬ hibited the scheduled Jerusalem congress.

259

On August 18 Nuri al-Sa'id (the foreign minister of Iraq) met with King Ghazi, Yasin Hashimi (the Iraqi prime minister) and Sir Archibald Kerr Clark (the British ambassador to Baghdad) to discuss Nuri's possible role as a mediator in the strike. On August 20, Nuri stopped off in Jerusalem "on his way to Europe." In Palestine he interviewed members of the Higher Committee for four days, including (with government permission) those interned at Sarafand. His plan for settlement was to stop the violence and wait for a suspension of immigration, then-and only then-to negotiate with the commission. What differentiated Nuri's scheme from Abdullah's was that Palestinians would still hold the trump card: the strike.

On August 23 the first apparent breakthrough in the strike occurred. The New York Times reported:

- Jerusalem, Aug. 22 (wireless) This correspondent learned tonight on the most reliable authority that it now has been definitely decided to order a stoppage of immigration from the time of the arrival of the British Royal Commission coming to investigate the Palestine disorders until after all the work in connection with the investigations and recom¬ mendations has been completed.26

The same day 25 prisoners were released from the Sarafand concentration camp.

Nuri then consulted with leaders in Amman and Cairo on August 25 and 26. The Higher Committee was to discuss the scheme privately on the twenty-fifth. On August 24, Awni Abdul Hadi had developed prob¬ lems with his teeth. At Nuri's request he was permitted to see a dentist in Jerusalem and was then allowed to stay on to participate in the talks. On August 26, the Higher Committee communicated with Nuri, then in Alexandria, their desire to meet with him again. But Falastin, an Arab daily in Palestine, reported that the militants would accept no scheme which would not eventuate in full independence for Palestine. On August 29 leaders of national-strike committees announced to the Higher Com¬ mittee that they would accept the commission on Nuri's terms. The New York Times reported that Nuri said he had "reasons to believe that Government would order the stoppage of Jewish immigration as soon as acts of violence cease."27 On August 30 the Higher Committee published a proclamation indicating that it had accepted Nuri's offer of mediation.

Negotiations have taken place between the Arab Higher Committee and Nuri Pasha Es-Said, the Foreign Minister of Iraq, for several days, during which all points relating to the Palestine Arab Case were dis¬ cussed in an atmosphere of confidence and frankness, as a result of which a complete understanding has been reached and the unanimous approval for the intervention of the Iraqi Government and the Arab Sovereign Princes has been given with complete confidence and satis¬ faction. The said minister will therefore conduct the necessary official correspondence in this matter, while at the same time the Arab Higher Committee will submit this proposal to the public at a congress of the National Committees for confirmation.

Meanwhile the general strike will continue with the same steadfast conviction hitherto shown until these negotiations are placed on a firm basis, which will secure to this nation its existence, and will fulfil its rights and hopes if God so wills it.28

Ibrahim Pasha, the Transjordanian premier, had been in Palestine since mid-August, and Fuad Hamzah, the Saudi Arabian undersecretary for foreign affairs, was rumored to be on his way.

Completing the Triangle: Enter the Zionists

Unlike the Arab nationalists, at the outset of the strike Jewish nationalists were blessed with an ongoing organization. This organization went to work immediately following the Jaffa demonstrations on April 19, and, like the Higher Committee, formulated demands and participated in diplomacy both inside and out of Palestine. While at first Zionist demands centered on the speedy cessation of the strike (preferably through the use of martial law) and small concessions to bolster the status of the national home under attack, later these demands quieted. They gave way to efforts of the diplomatic wing to disseminate a Zionist interpretation of the Palestine events. This interpretation obscured the primary Arab demand for independence, substituting for it an anti-Semitic desire on the part of the Arabs to stop Jewish immigration to Palestine and, with the help of the strike, to strangle the yet embryonic national home there. Efforts to mediate and negotiations for a settlement of the strike were in actuality not bilateral, but trilateral: the Zionists completed the triangle.

Following the Jaffa riots on April 19, the authorities had sanctioned the formation of a Jewish supernumerary force to protect Tel Aviv, permitting it to use weapons already stored there. Two days later the Tel Aviv Executive Council issued a set of formal demands to the authorities. The authorities had dismissed these, counseling patience. On May 7, the day the Arabs voted civil disobedience, the Executive Council repeated its demands that the government move the courts and government offices from Jaffa to Tel Aviv, that it give special considerations to strike victims, and that it offer greater protection to the city. On the following day, May 8, the government offices were moved.

Throughout May, Zionist officials grew increasingly impatient with the authorities' reluctance to intern or exterminate all rebels and repeatedly argued for the imposition of martial law. On May 14 the demands of the Executive Council were again submitted to the high commissioner by a deputation led by Tel Aviv's Mayor Dizengoff. The deputation strongly criticized the Palestine government for not taking strict measures in the country's present condition. Mayor Dizengoff said he was speaking on behalf of 150,000 Jews in Tel Aviv who wanted to know whether or not they have a high commissioner.

The deputation further demanded a Jewish army which could function in the event the government found itself "too weak" to do so. In response the high commissioner praised the delegation's exemplary behavior and self-control, … [and] requested Jews to fortify themselves with more patience.29

Although the authorities displayed the forces under their command by holding a military parade in Jerusalem on May 17, Zionists repeated their criticisms of Wauchope's policies. But the Palestine Post noted philosophically that even the extermination of the entire Jewish population of Palestine would not change history since Europe stood behind the national home.30

The Tel Aviv Executive Council had repeatedly complained that the Jaffa boatmen's strike had severed Tel Aviv's link with the outside world - a link without which the city could not survive. They demanded permission to build a jetty at the mouth of the Yarkon River to eliminate Jewish dependence upon the "Arab" port at Jaffa. Dampened festivities at the Levant Trade Fair in Tel Aviv had dramatized the importance of a port to the city. Although the fair had opened as scheduled on May 1, the opening of the pavilions had been delayed a week. Much of the merchandise to be displayed was either inaccessible in the Jaffa port area or had been rerouted through the Haifa port, where Jews as well as Arabs unloaded ships. Because of the disturbances, attendance at the fair was little more than half that of the previous trade fair (320,000 as opposed to 600,000 in 1934).

Thus the authorities approved the building of a port at Tel Aviv, in spite of the high surf there, which engineers said would hamper loading and unloading operations. On May 19 the government allowed the first ship to be unloaded at Tel Aviv. Between May 26 and June 2 municipal officials made £P 76,000 in subscriptions available to the public to finance the port. On June 4 the government officially approved plans to build the jetty and dredge the river mouth. With this, and the announcement on May 28 that the government would furnish a Jewish youth force with weapons, Zionist opposition to official policies in Palestine appeared to subside.

In fact, this opposition took on a new character. Having purged itself of negative demands, the policy became "constructive." Zionists now appealed for increased Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine and for the reaffirmation of the Jewish rights guaranteed under the mandate. Thus on May 28 the Jewish Agency petitioned for official British encouragement of settlement in Palestine. The Pro-Palestine Federation (of America) reminded the British authorities of the plight of German Jewry, urging support for the Palestinian haven for victims of European anti-Semitism. The Zionist Federation of Great Britain expressed fears for the safety of Palestinian Jewry, urging the arming of Jews there. On June 21 the Jewish Agency Executive called for a world-wide mobilization of "their forces for a well-balanced political effort and strengthened constructive endeavor to protect the Jewish population in Palestine."31 The next day the United Palestine Appeal announced its intention to raise $3.5 million to aid in the endeavor.

By mid-August, and with the increasing success of Arab attempts to begin negotiations for a settlement of the strike, Zionists made several decisive political moves aimed at obscuring the primary Arab demand for independence. Participants in the First World Jewish Congress, meeting the second week of August in Geneva, called attention to the right guaranteed under the mandate for Jews to immigrate to Palestine and resolved to urge the League of Nations and the British government not to alter the status of the Balfour Declaration in the mandate. On August 17 the Zionist National Council, meeting under the leadership of Mr. Isaac Ben Zvi, resolved to "mobilize world Jewish opinion against even a temporary suspension of the immigration which is so essential to its conception of Zionism."32

On August 21 Mayor Dizengoff castigated the government for not taking more strict measures against the Arabs and accused authorities of "blocking the national home." On August 24, a Zionist delegation again urged the high commissioner to impose martial law. Referring to the New York Times report that the authorities would shortly suspend immigra¬ tion to facilitate Nuri al-Sa'id's mediation, Dr. Chaim Weizmann called for Jews to "exercise all moral pressure, which is the only weapon at their disposal against such an astonishing action."33 And so the litany continued.

Mobilization of the Military

Caught between two irreconcilable sets of demands, Wauchope had no choice but to take the middle road. While wielding the civil powers at his command in no uncertain terms, he also made restrained use of his military authority. By midsummer, however, the authorities were strad¬ dling the fine line between civil repression and outright martial law. Wauchope's initial restraint had proved reassuring to neither the Arabs nor the Zionists, and from May through September, unit after unit of the British army entered Palestine. In the early part of the strike this military force did not sufficiently intimidate the rebels; by June the scene of conflict had shifted to the countryside, where orthodox military methods were ineffective in the control of guerrilla warfare. By September, after a series of high-level political maneuvers, the decision was made in London over Wauchope's head to issue a proclamation which would facilitate the imposition of martial law. With the presence of over 20,000 troops in Palestine, civil disobedience had no chance of success.

In the early part of the strike military techniques and personnel were used sparingly. Cities where disturbances occurred were cordoned off and patrolled by "occupation" police. After April 25 the police were armed and empowered to use their guns in crowd control. By June 2 military reinforcements were empowered to work as police in crowd control and

264

preventive patrols. But as the disturbances proceeded unabated, the authorities called in increasing numbers of police and military. As of December 31, 1935, the Palestine police force had consisted of 2,576 men, of whom 1,465 were Arabs, 746 were British, and 365 were Jewish. By the end of 1936 the forces had been increased by almost 1,000 men to include 1,902 Arabs, 930 British, and 484 Jews. In addition, 3,000 Jewish supernumerary police were authorized in 1936, more than 2,000 of whom were in action by June 24.

The Palestine Defense Force (British regulars) normally consisted of 1,970 men, most of whom were in the two infantry divisions stationed in Palestine. By May 10 the first reinforcements of 300 infantrymen arrived in Palestine. On May 21 a battalion of Seaforth Highlanders left Egypt for Palestine. By the beginning of June, the Royal Scots Fusilers, the Loyal Regiment, and the Cameron Highlanders were all in Palestine. On June 2, the Second Battalion of the Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment arrived; on June 7 the First Battalion of the York and Lancaster Regiment arrived from Alexandria; on June 9 the Second Battalion of the Cheshire Regiment arrived from Egypt; on June 28 the Eighth Hussars (mechanized cavalry) arrived in Palestine. This made a total of nine battalions over and above regular troop strength in Palestine. Almost two brigades of regular British troops were operating in the country by the end of June.

At the end of August, the First Battalion of the King's Own Scottish Borders sailed from Malta. Royal Navy personnel even participated in land operations, aiding in the Jaffa demolitions and policing Haifa and Nablus. When Arab railroad operators went on strike, naval personnel operated the trains. These personnel were further aided by 700 members of the Royal Air Force. Meanwhile, troops from other parts of the Med¬ iterranean were being redeployed to Egypt to beef-up depleted forces there. Troops came with full battle equipment, including tanks, armored cars, and machine guns. In a Questions Session in Commons, Mr. Gal- lacher asked Mr. Duff Cooper, secretary of state for war, the number of casualties in the entire British Imperial Army so far in the year. As of July 14 there had been 33, all of which had occurred in Palestine.

At the inception of the disorders, these troops were used primarily as police reinforcements in the cities to handle unruly crowds. By mid-June, however, the scene of disorders had spread to the countryside, and sabo¬ tage in the rural areas became increasingly well-organized and aggressive as the strike progressed. Peasants had joined other rebels who occupied themselves by sniping at Jewish colonies, police patrols, and police billets. Many of these rebels intimidated rich farmers, extorting contributions to the strike fund and forcibly dissuading conservatives from open opposition to the strike. Rebels bombed railways and held up convoys of vehicles

265

traveling the roads. Little boys were encouraged to keep roads well-strewn with nails, large pieces of scrap metal, and stones.

But just as urban violence occurred when troops or police used force to break up protest demonstrations, most rural violence occurred when troops attempted to collect fines, conduct searches and seizures, or demol¬ ish houses. Here the military encountered grave difficulties in the control of the resistance movement, which fought not so much to express national convictions as to defend its own property. Particularly after the May 7 declaration of the Higher Committee, conflict centered in Arab or pre¬ dominantly Arab areas and-as in the cities-most rural violence appeared between the Arabs and police. Participation of Jews in open conflict, either as victims or as perpetrators of terrorism, was relatively small.

On July 6 the military announced a "comb out" in progress in the rural area bounded by Jerusalem, Nablus, Tulkarm, and Lydda. Up to this time strategists had assumed that resistance to British authority was reducible to intimidation of the peasantry by "marauding bands." Four thousand troops participated in the "comb out," utilizing machine guns and tanks. While this formidable army passed through the area searching homes for contraband and arresting members of the populace, RAF planes dropped leaflets reminding the "natives" that Britain would protect them against intimidation if they stopped the strike. By the end of the operations the following day, officials announced that troops had en¬ countered only small pockets of resistance but that the area was under control. In an engagement July 8 in the area declared "combed out," six Arabs were killed and one wounded. The London Times correspondent again identified the problem:

The lesson to be gained from the operations seems to be that although the troops, thanks to their superior number and efficient organization, are able to deal promptly with marauders when they try to attack, they are faced with an extremely difficult task when they try to seek them out.34

Encounters and operations of this sort continued in Palestine until 1939. As the 1936 disorders progressed, the authorities used more force. By August troops were using the RAF as cover rather than for leafletting. By September the resistance had shot down at least one of the planes. The authorities found these miltary difficulties embarrassing-doubly so thanks to continual reminders of the threatened status of the British- guaranteed national home. Rumors surrounding Nuri's mediation attempts brought these reminders to a crescendo. Matters came to a head on August 31 with the Palestine Post's publication of an inflammatory article on Nuri's mediations. According to the London Times, the article said in part that all the proceedings of the last few days' hiatus have shifted the centre of gravity in the administration of the country, in the public mind at all events, from Government House to the Headquarters of the Moslem Supreme Council.35

In London, on September 1, Chaim Weizmann wrote a letter to Mr. Ormsby-Gore, imploring him not to allow a suspension of immigration into Palestine and enclosed a copy of the Palestine Post article.

On September 2 the British Cabinet met in special session to discuss recent European events and a dispatch from Sir Arthur Wauchope, the high commissioner in Palestine. Only 14 of the 21 Cabinet members were present. Some, including the prime minister, were on holiday; one had the chicken pox. The meeting lasted four hours. After the meeting Mr. Ormsby-Gore answered Weizmann's letter, disavowing any statement that the authorities intended to suspend immigration.

No such terms have been agreed to either by the High Commissioner or by His Majesty's Government. Moreover there is no foundation for the suggestion which is referred to in the letter addressed August 31 by the Jewish Agency to the High Commissioner that the High Commissioner has authorized Nuri Pasha to give assurances regarding measures including the suspension of immigration to be taken after the cessation of the disturbances. Not only has Nuri Pasha not been authorized to give any assurances, but, Sir Arthur Wauchope states, he has not asked for any such authority.36

The same day, war games at Sussex were abruptly canceled. The First Division (15,000 strong) was given orders to proceed directly to Palestine. This division consisted of twelve infantry battalions, including artillery. Friday night, September 4, the government called out reserves to augment the English forces. Commenting on these moves, the London Times reported "Arab despair" and "Jewish satisfaction."37 The high commissioner, however, continued to oppose the imposition of martial law in Palestine. The next day he met with British military authorities and conferred with Abdullah in Amman. He pleaded with the amir to use his offices to call off the strike before the declaration of martial law. Abdullah regretted that he could do nothing until the government agreed to negotiate with the Higher Committee. On September 5 and 6 the Higher Committee met in Jerusalem. They counseled Arabs to remain calm.

On September 7 the government issued a policy statement giving its official interpretation of the events of the strike and disorders. The proclamation implied that Nuri's mediation efforts had failed because the Higher Committee refused to call off the strike. It declared that agreement with the Arab demands would constitute an abrogation of the mandate. Therefore it officially announced the calling-in of troop reinforcements and the appointment of Gen. J. G. Dill as commander of these forces.38

Astonished, the Higher Committee met on the seventh and eighth to discuss strategy. They announced that they had empowered Nuri to negotiate in their stead with the authorities and had been waiting for the authorities to contact Nuri. With the Higher Committee still meeting on the ninth, al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni, Raghib Nashashibi, and Moshe Sharett (from the Jewish Agency) went to Wauchope's office to dispute the accuracy of certain details in the government's policy statement. Apparently Wauchope was interested in the Palestinians' charges. He held intensive meetings with the Higher Committee throughout the following three days.

The Higher Committee issued another proclamation on the thirteenth, making the following statements: (1) The rioting began in Tel Aviv and was not started by Arabs. (2) The strike was called to dramatize the Palestinian demand for independence. (3) Many illegal acts committed by Arabs were committed in response to repressive acts on the part of troops. (4) By Mr. Ormsby-Gore's own admission, intimidation played a very small role in the Arab resistance to colonial authority. (5) The government's promise of a royal commission was not sufficient to end the strike because the government regularly failed to follow the recom¬ mendations of its commissions. (6) The intervention of the Arab mon- archs and Nuri's mediation have not failed, since their offers still stand. Nuri was then engaged in talks with other governments on the Palestine situation. The proclamation continued with the statement that the Committee asked the continuance of the strike only until the other parties had accepted the principle of intervention, which principle had been accepted by the Committee.39

268

The same day General Dill, commander of emergency forces in Palestine, arrived. It was announced that Lt. Col. F. H. Kisch had been appointed the Jewish liaison to the British military in Palestine.

On the eighteenth of September, eight British Cabinet members and several military advisers met to consider a proclamation enabling the high commissioner in Palestine to declare martial law. A dispatch from Wauchope indicated that negotiations were again in sight. Thus, action on the proclamation was delayed. Meanwhile the Higher Committee engaged in negotiations with the kings of Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Trans¬ jordan. But since no concrete program had been submitted to the British authorities within a week, London approved the Palestine Martial Law (Defense) Order-in-Council on September 26. The declaration, published September 29,40 empowered the high commissioner to execute actions, such as the declaration of martial law, which were not subject to appeal. Although Wauchope was thus empowered to declare martial law, he never exercised his power.

Proposals for a Settlement and Arab Intervention

The Higher Committee was in a most difficult position. Palestinians had been on strike for more than five months in order to achieve a position from which they could negotiate changes in British policy. The strike had indeed mobilized Palestinians, but the colonial authorities refused to make a move toward negotiations. Instead they would soon declare martial law and forcibly put down resistance. It was questionable whether continuance of the strike would enhance the Palestinian position before the royal commission, although it had altered British opinion of the mandate. The Zionists, on the other hand, had profited by the strike; as the underdogs they had gained both world sympathy and significant concessions affecting their status in Palestine. In September their international diplomatic efforts took on an even more constructive appearance as they put forth proposals for a settlement of the Palestine conflict.

The events following Nuri's attempts at mediation were a replay of events of the previous month. In issuing the August 30 proclamation, the Higher Committee had again called for a congress of representatives of local national-strike committees. This was to be held in Jerusalem on September 17. On the fourteenth the committee deliberated on the termination of the strike. By this time the government had announced that it would compensate homeowners and renters of demolished Jaffa property, and this was a concession of sorts. But on September 7 Wauchope had ordered that the planned congress not be held, presumably because of possible rioting in Jerusalem. Tension in Palestine, which had diminished following the August 30 proclamation of the Higher Committee, increased sharply after the government's September 7 order.

On the sixteenth the Higher Committee again discussed strategy and announced that instead of proceeding to Jerusalem for the congress, delegates of the local national-strike committees should assemble at the offices of their respective district commissioners. At the meetings on the seventeenth the district commissioners reread a statement that the high commissioner had delivered to the Higher Committee on the twelfth. This statement reminded strikers of impending martial law in Palestine and concomitant penalties for disobeying the law. Like the Higher Committee the week before, strike leaders repeated that they could not assure the government that the strike would cease unless they knew of the government's intention to enter into negotiations at the strike's end. Arab leaders meeting with the Jerusalem district commissioner informed him that even if they were to terminate the strike, their constituents would not follow the order. Strikers in the cities and rebels in the hills awaited the concession on immigration. On the seventeenth, Wauchope and General Dill conferred with members of the military and flew to Amman for a conference with Abdullah.

But the strike leaders knew that to continue the strike past this point might well work against the national interests of the Palestinians as it had already worked against the economic interests of the strikers. The Spanish Civil War had eliminated competition from Spain in the citrus market, and citrus prices had increased 60 per cent. Zionists were ready to corner the market. Arab jobs, including picking, packing, loading, and transporting, would revert to nonstrikers, and missing one season would mean that most Arab growers would fail to make payments on their farms. Their land then would be alienated, as Zionists were ready buyers. Toward the end of September more troops would arrive in Palestine, with money to spend. This would be added to Zionist coffers if the Arabs did not end the strike. Finally, funds provided for the resistance were running out. With the government holding firm, the only hope for negotiations lay with the royal commission. With the Palestinian people holding firm, the only hope for ending the strike lay with intervention by the heads of the semi-independent Arab states. Thus, since June the Higher Committee had hung its hopes on the intervention of other Arab states, but there was always the possibility that their efforts, like Nuri's, would be dis¬ credited.

270

Thus the Higher Committee drafted the appeal which heads of independent Arab states would make to Palestinians to end the strike. The committee was in contact with the Saudi Arabian and Iraqi consulates in Cairo and Haifa respectively and apparently with representatives in Jerusalem of King Abdullah and Amir Yahya of the Yemen. On September 24 the committee agreed on the wording of the appeal and sent the draft to the various Arab capitals. On September 28 it was known that the four governments had agreed in principle to the draft, although some wanted alterations in its exact wording. Shaykh Qassab of Saudi Arabia arrived in Palestine from Cairo bearing a letter from King Ibn Saud explaining his alterations to the appeal. Other changes in wording were to be made by the monarchs concerned and agreed to by the committee.

Meanwhile the Zionists had also been formulating plans for a settlement. At a conference of Anglo-Jewry in London, Jewish Agency representatives stated that the government ought to put down disturbances forcibly rather than to allow Palestinians to state their case before another royal commission. On September 11 Mr. Bevin suggested in a letter to the editor of the London Times that Palestinians repeat in Iraq, an Arab country, the process by which Zionists had "improved" Palestine. Reconstructing irrigation works in Iraq destroyed by a series of barbaric invasions from the East, Palestinians too could "make the desert bloom," in the process restoring Iraq's former grandeur.41

The Round Table Plan, generally associated with Chaim Weizmann, had evolved in late August and early September in the letters to the editor section of the London Times. In a letter published August 28, Mr. Israel M. Sieff proposed a round table conference between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. Three days later Lord Winterton concurred, as did Lord Lugard on September 2. On September 4, Chaim Weizmann accepted the proposal.42 The Palestine Post of September 6 and October 5 sketched out the plan. It was based on the assumption that Palestinians and Zionists were the true protagonists in Palestine and the mandatory authorities were simply overseers. Petty squabbles occur in the best of families and the two Semitic cousins ought to reason out their differences in a civilized manner, face to face over the peace table. For the September 17 (Jewish New Year) edition of the Palestine Post, Weizmann wrote a piece entitled "Palestine To-Day, the Common Fatherland for Arab and Jew." Whereas the plan was intuitively appealing, it substituted racism and the "clash

271

of nationalisms" for the Palestinians' will not to be colonized. It thus obscured what had been a primary Palestinian goal from 1916 on: self-determination. The Palestinians felt that since the British had promised Arab independence but in the same breath brought Zionism to Palestine, the only lasting settlement would be one reached through negotiations between Palestinians and the British, not between Palestinians and the Zionists.

In the first week of October the Higher Committee continued its deliberation sessions. Awni Abdul Hadi returned to Jerusalem from a two-day trip to Amman where he had seen Abdullah and conferred by telephone with the Iraqi prime minister. On October 3 it was announced that the kings would appeal for cessation of the strike only if the government granted an amnesty to persons arrested for noncapital offenses during the disturbances. On October 8 the Higher Committee received the following appeal from Abdullah, Ghazi, and Ibn Saud:

To our Sons the Arabs of Palestine (through the Arab Higher Committee) - We have been greatly pained by the prevailing situation in Palestine. We, together with our brethren the Kings and the Emir, call upon you to resort to quietness in order to prevent bloodshed, confident in the good intentions of our ally, the British Government, which has declared its desire to administer justice. Rest assured that we shall continue our efforts for the purpose of assisting you.43

For the third time the Higher Committee called a congress of delegates of national-strike committees, this time with success. On October 9 and 10 the Higher Committee read and discussed the appeals with delegates, along with constraints on them to end the strike. The congress voted to accept the appeal and to publish it on Sunday, October 11, along with their acceptance of it. Monday, October 12, was the anniversary of Muhammad's journey to Jerusalem, a holy day. Though the holiday was a Muslim affair, many Christian Arab churches also held thanksgiving services.

Order but not amity was restored. Many shops had opened the week before. By the end of the week business was back to normal: locks on shutters had been unstuck, keys lost since April remade, and wares dusted off. In the holiday atmosphere proprietors enthusiastically bargained with patrons and watched out for affluent British troops in the

272

market for souvenirs. There was speculation over the troop withdrawal, but by the end of the year withdrawal was complete.

The strike and disturbances had exacted a terrible price. Officially, there were 314 dead and 1,337 wounded. The civilian dead included 187 Arab Muslims, 10 Arab Christians, and 80 Jews; police fatalities included 7 British, 8 Muslim Arabs, and 1 Jew; and military fatalities included 21 British. Among the wounded civilians were 768 Muslim Arabs, 55 Christian Arabs, and 308 Jews; police personnel wounded included 40 British, 41 Muslim Arabs, 13 Christian Arabs, and 8 Jews. Military personnel wounded included 104 British. In these figures Arab casualties are significantly undercounted.44

The popular Arab reaction to the strike's end was that it had actually failed. There was little confidence that the government would address itself to even the minimum Palestinian demand. As early as October 11 it was proposed that Palestinians redouble their efforts to regulate land transfers. A buy-Arab, sell-Arab campaign to eliminate Jewish middlemen was suggested to bring home to the British colonial authorities-and to the Zionists-the dual obligation of the mandate. But the guerrillas in the hills dispersed, some say to participate in the orange season. On October 26 Fawzi al-Din al-Qawiqji and his forces were surrounded by British troops but were allowed to escape to Syria. Many Arabs took this, as well as the granting of suspended sentences to rioters, as government acts of faith. Zionists also had mixed feelings about the strike's end. Many would rather it had been put down by force, and most disliked the idea of the Arab monarchs' intervention. The intervention established a "danger¬ ous precedent" insofar as Palestine might identify with, or be identified with, independent Arab states.45

The Peel Commission arrived in Palestine on November 5, 1936. On the same day the secretary of state announced a new labor schedule. The 1,800 quota was considerably below the previous one; the government justified the drop by citing Palestine's lowered economic absorptive capac¬ ity and made an abusive allusion to the Arab demand for cessation of Jew¬ ish immigration. In fact the strike and volume of immigration previous to it had greatly reduced the absorptive capacity roughly to the level suggested by the quota size; the reduction of the quota was, therefore, not a conces¬ sion. Arabs boycotted the Peel Commission, in effect allowing Zionists to use it as a forum to present their demands. Again the Arab monarchs inter¬ vened, urging Palestinians to present their case before it was too late. This they finally did in January, 1937, in the last ten days of the hearings.

273

Although the Peel Commission reaffirmed the national home as an obligation of the mandate, its recommendations went beyond recommendations of other commissions of inquiry. It concluded that the mandate did include contrary obligations, and that efforts to implement recommendations of other commissions within the framework of the mandate had failed utterly. Political as well as economic absorptive capacity ought to be considered in the granting of immigration quotas, and these ought to be limited. Land sales in certain areas ought to be regulated. The commission did not endorse Palestinians' demand for self-government. Its conclusions, like its (de jure) limitations in the terms of inquiry, were couched entirely within the framework of the mandate. Thus the Peel Commission did not fully investigate the substance of Palestinians' claims to Palestine. Moreover, it observed that schemes for self-government in 1922 and 1935 had ended in discord. Abandoning hopes for an eventual Arab-Zionist entente in Palestine, it suggested partition.46

Until the end of July, 1937, Palestinians and non-Palestinian Arabs condemned the plan. Raghib Nashashibi, who had since broken off from the Higher Committee, condemned it on July 11, and on the twenty-third the Higher Committee followed, restating the Arab demands. Initially Zionists soundly rejected the partition plan, Weizmann holding that it would "crystallize" the national home within but a fraction of its true boundaries. Others went further, making specific territorial counterdemands. Although the Zionists eventually accepted a partition plan, the Arabs never did.

By late September guerrilla warfare had again erupted in Palestine. Empowered by another (Defense) Order-in-Council, the high commis¬ sioner outlawed the Higher Committee and the local national-strike committees. Authorities swore out warrants for the arrest of the leaders. Al-Hajj Amin and Jamal Husayni fled to Lebanon and Egypt respectively, but Mayor Khalidi, Ya'qub Ghusayn, Ahmad Hilmi Pasha, and Fuad Saba (editor of Palestine and Transjordan), and others were exiled to the Seychelles. By mid-October, 100 Arabs had been arrested. These actions ushered in yet another period of rebellion, which lasted until 1939.

The general strike of 1936 was more than simply a continuation of Palestinians' protest against the British sanction of Zionist colonization of their country and hence the dispossession of the Palestinians from their land. Several new features entered the Palestine conflict at this time. The intervention of the semi-independent Arab states marked a step toward Arab unity and as such constituted a diplomatic victory. In late December of 1936 Arab heads of state considered the formation of an Arab federa¬ tion.47 This unity was an attempt to counterbalance international Zionist pressures on the mandatory power. The strike marked the first appearance of Third World support for the Palestinian case. But it also marked the first appearance of a Jewish Army in Palestine and, toward summer's end, organized Jewish terrorism. It signaled further geographical as well as ideological separation of Arabs and Zionists in Palestine, to be "crystal¬ lized" in later partition suggestions. It marked the first appearance of the Round Table idea of direct negotiations. These developments led to new Zionist strategies for the attainment of Palestine.

Notes:

• 1. Great Britain, Colonial Office, Report by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Palestine and Trans-Jordan for the Year 1935 (Colonial no. 112; London, 1936), p. 15 (series cited hereafter as Palestine Report).
• 2. The account of the disturbances presented in this essay is based upon day-to-day accounts in the New York Times; the Times (London) (all citations are to the Royal edition); Manchester Guardian Weekly; Palestine and Transjordan; and various British government reports. Different accounts of the outbreak of violence are given in Christopher Sykes, Crossroads to Israel (Cleveland, 1965), p. 148; and the Times (London), April 24, 1936, p. 7. Nevill Barbour, whose own account of the outbreak closely follows that of the official Palestine Report, 1936, adds, "attempts made by the Jewish Agency to dispute the accuracy of this account were completely refuted by the Accredited Representative before the Permanent Mandates Commission (Minutes} 32nd Session, p. 145)" (Barbour, Palestine: Star or Crescent? [New York, 1947], p. 196n).
• 3. Palestine Report, 1936, p. 7.
• 4. Ibid.
• 5. April 29, 1936, p. 13.
• 6. Cited in Matiel E. T. Mogannam, The Arab Woman and the Palestine Problem (London, 1937), p. 295.
• 7. Times (London), April 29, 1936, p. 14.
• 8. The original officers of the Higher Committee were al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni, who was the grand mufti of Jerusalem and who supported the Palestine Arab Party, president; Awni Abdul Hadi, who was a lawyer and head of the Istiqlal Party, secretary; and Ahmad Hilmi Pasha, who was a manager of the Arab Nation Bank (an institution founded to finance Palestinian smallholders whose land might other¬ wise be alienated), treasurer. Original members of the committee included Jamal Husayni, a cousin of the mufti and formal head of the Palestine Arab Party; Raghib Nashashibi, a former mayor of Jerusalem and former member of the Ottoman Parliament who was associated with the National Defense Party; Abd al-Latif Salah, a lawyer from Nablus who led the National League; Dr. Husayn Khalidi, a physi¬ cian who was mayor of Jerusalem at the time of the strike and was a founder and leader of the Islah (Reform) Party; Ya'qub Ghusayn, a landowner and entrepreneur who was on the Board of Directors of the Arab Nation Bank and was associated with both the Young Muslims Association and the Arab Youth Executive Congress; Ya'qub Faraj, a member of the Arab Executive, the deputy mayor of Jerusalem,5 and an important member of the Arab Orthodox Christian community, who was on the central committee of the National Defense Party; and Alfred Rock, an entrepreneur engaged in orange growing and shipping, who was associated with the Palestine Arab Party and was an active member of the Arab Roman Catholic community.
• 9. Statement outlined in Mogannam, Arab Woman, pp. 297-98.
• 10. New York Times, May 6, 1936, p. 16.
• 11. Entire document reprinted in Mogannam, Arab Woman, pp. 298-99.
• 12. They included Dajani (who had recently been released from jail), Ibrahim Shanti, editor of Al-Difa' (an Arab daily) and Akram Zu'aytar, a community leader from Nablus.
• 13. Document reprinted in Mogannam, Arab Woman, pp. 300-1.
• 14. New York Times, May 1*8, 1936, p. 1.
• 15. Senior officials: Great Britain, Foreign Office, Palestine Royal Commission, Report of the Palestine Royal Commission (Parliamentary Papers, Cmd. 5479; London, 1937) [Peel Commission Report], pp. 401-3; Religious court officials: ibid., p. 99.
• 16. Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 313, (June 19, 1936), col. 1320, by Ormsby-Gore (cited hereafter as Debates, Commons).
• 17. Mogannam enumerated some of these: "Faiz Bey Haddad, Chairman of the National Committee of Jerusalem; Fakhri Bey Nashashibi, formerly Assistant Mayor of Jerusalem; Izzet Effendi Darwaza, General Director Awkaf; Nebih Bey al Ad- meh, a leading member of the Istiklal Party; Abdul Hamid Effendi Shuman, General Manager of the Arab Bank; … Ajaj Effendi Nuwaihed, Editor of the Arab Weekly; Ibrahim Effendi Shanti, Proprietor and Editor of Ad-Difaa newspaper; Rasheed Effendi Al Haj Ibrahim, Manager of the Arab Bank, Haifa; Ahmed Effendi Shukairi, Advocate of Acre; Hanna Effendi Asfour, Advocate of Haifa; Dr. Mustapha Busknak, Local Director of Awkaf, Nablus; Subhi Bey Al Khadra, Advocate and Local Director of Awkaf, Acre; … and many other Doctors and Advocates" (Arab Woman, pp. 305-6n.)
• 18. June 22, 1936, p. 14.
• 19. The notices are reprinted along with two decisions for the case in Palestine and Transjordan, July 11, 1936, supplement. A less detailed but more available ac¬ count appears in the Times (London), July 6, 1936, p. 13.
• 20. The Zionist Palestine Economic Review explained, "the 4,500 quota should result in the immigration of a larger number of individuals, as each certificate allotted to married men covers a whole family unit" (Vol. I, No. 6-7 [June-July, 1936], p. 6).
• 21. But as early as 1919, delegates representing Muslim, Christian, and Jewish communities in the Ottoman province of Syria (Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine) resolved to "reject the claims of the Zionists for the establishment of a Jewish common¬ wealth in that part of southern Syria which is known as Palestine, and we are opposed to Jewish immigration into any part of the country. We do not acknowledge that they have a title, and we regard their claims as a grave menace to our national, political, and economic life. Our Jewish fellow-citizens shall continue to enjoy the rights and to bear the responsibilities which are ours in common" ("Resolutions of the General Syrian Congress, Damascus, July 2, 1919"; reprinted in appendix G of George Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement [1938; New York, 1965], pp. 440-42, quote from p. 441. These resolutions along with 1,800 others were presented to the American section of the Inter-Allied Commission (King-Crane Commission), which commented in its report, "with a deep sense of sympathy for the Jewish cause, the Commissioners feel bound to recommend that only a greatly reduced Zionist programme be attempted by the Peace Conference, and even that, only very gradually initiated. This would have to mean that Jewish immigration should be definitely limited, and that the project for making Palestine distinctly a Jewish commonwealth should be given up" ("Recommendations of the King-Crane Commission with regard to Syria-Palestine and Iraq"; reprinted in appendix H of Antonius, The Arab Awakeninga pp. 443-58, quote from p. 450; italics added).
• 22. New York Times, June 8, 1936, p. 10.
• 23. Times (London), June 29, 1936, p. 14; see below, "The Mobilization of the Military," for a discussion of the use of military forces.
• 24. New York Times, July 14, 1936, p. 9.
• 25. July 30, 1936, p. 4.
• 26. August 23, 1936, p. 10.
• 27. August 28, 1936, p. 3 (dated Jerusalem, August 27).
• 28. Palestine and Transjordan, September 12, 1936, p. 4.
• 29. New York Times, May 15, 1936, p. 16.
• 30. New York Times, May 18, 1936, p. 11.
• 31. New York Times, June 22, 1936, p. 1.
• 32. Times (London), August 18, 1936, p. 10; compare New York Times, August 14, 1936, p. 2.
• 33. Times (London), August 27, 1936, p. 12.
• 34. July 8, 1936, p. 14.
• 35. September 1, 1936, p. 12.
• 36. Times (London), September 4, 1936, p. 12.
• 37. September 5, 1936, p. 10.
• 38. September 7 declaration reprinted in the Times (London), September 8, p. 12. Dill had been the director of military operations and intelligence in the War Office.
• 39. Palestine and Transjordan, September 19, 1936, pp. 5, 8.
• 40. Text of declaration in the Times (London) September 30, 1936, p. 11.
• 41. September 7, 1936, p. 7 (Inskip); September 11, p. 10 (Bevin).
• 42. The Times (London), August 28, p. 8 (Sieff); August 31, p. 13 (Lord Winterton); September 2, p. 11 (Lord Lugard); September 4, p. 13 (Weizmann).
• 43. Palestine and Transjordan, October 17, 1936, p. 5. This is the wording of King Ghazi's appeal. British sources normally reprint either Saud's or Abdullah's wording, in which "our friend" is substituted for Ghazi's "our ally."
• 44. Debates, Commons, vol. 316, (October 29, 1936), 5th ser., col. 13, by Ormsby-Gore; see also Palestine Report, 1936, pp. 19-20.
• 45. Times (London), October 13, 1936, p. 10.
• 46. See Peel Commission Report. A partial transcript of the proceedings of the commission may be found in Great Britain, Colonial Office, Palestine Royal Commission, Minutes of Evidence Heard at Public Sessions (Colonial no. 134; London, 1937).
• 47. Times (London), December 29, 1936, p. 11.