Black September - the PLO Version from Youtube

In 1948, the State of Israel was proclaimed. Palestine was lost. 16 years later, in 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organization, or the PLO, was founded. Made up of different factions, the PLO has been at the heart of the struggle to regain Palestine ever since.

By the end of the 60s, the Palestinians had become masters of their own destiny. But a bloody showdown was on the horizon. Not with Israel, but with fellow Arabs. The Palestinian Commando Movement emerged as a force to be reckoned with in the region following the defeat of the Arab states in the 1967 war. The Palestinians had taken their first step towards emancipation from the Arab world.

Mamdouh Nofal Senior DFLP Official: "All of these factors dealt a knockout blow to the Arab custodianship of the Palestinians and their cause, and thus Palestinians became the masters of their destiny."

The Palestinians took full advantage of the state of chaos suffered by the defeated Arab regimes. Palestinian guerrilla factions, the most prominent of which was Fatah, consolidated their grip on the refugee camps in the Arab world. Hundreds of fresh recruits enrolled to join these factions. The image of young fedayeen, or freedom fighters, clad in the traditional Palestinian headscarf became an icon of resistance. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser cast aside his initial misgivings and embraced Fatah. At the same time, he dissolved his traditional alliance with the Arab Nationalist Movement, a rival Palestinian faction to Fatah.

Bassam Abu Sharif, PFLP: "Nasser broke off his relationship with the Arab Nationalist Movement and adopted Fatah. Not only did he adopt Fatah, but he also took Arafat with him on a trip to Moscow.

Cockroach: "I walked in and Nasser met me across the room, and lo and behold the Soviet troika got up, worked towards me and greeted me. The next day they launched an official dialogue with me."

Other Arab regimes also vied for influence among the Palestinians as a way to gain leverage on the regional scene. Both Iraq and Syria encouraged the establishment of new Palestinian guerrilla factions allied to them. A declassified CIA document found that Fatah's independence had influenced Syria's decision to set up a Palestinian faction whose allegiance lay firmly with Damascus. The Syrian government, unable to subvert Fatah for use as a political weapon, recently organized a group known as the Vanguard of the People's Liberation War. But not all Arab states held the Palestinians in such high esteem. King Hussein was still reeling from the loss of the West Bank in 1967.

Adnan Abu Odeh, Advisor to Hussein: "Israel's occupation of the West Bank effectively meant the loss of half the country. Imagine a person suddenly having to walk on one leg. That's why the 1967 war was such an earthquake for Jordan.

In Jordan, armed Palestinians strolled through the streets, enjoying freedom of movement and launching operations from Jordanian territory against Israel. Jordan began to view these attacks with increasing alarm. Nasser was assisting the Palestinians in training and arms, but he ensured that no operations were launched from Egyptian territory without stringent Egyptian control and coordination. Fatah and other Palestinian factions acted with much greater freedom within the weaker state of Jordan. In 1969, Palestinian commandos shot down a Lebanese army helicopter during clashes with the Lebanese state. An Egyptian-brokered agreement known as the Cairo Accord put an end to the clashes. But the Accord effectively legitimized the presence of armed Palestinian factions on Lebanese soil, something which was to have serious consequences for stability in Lebanon in the years to come. Besides creating waves in Arab regimes, the Palestinian factions also revolutionized their own society. In 1969, Fatah leader Yasser Arafat was elected chairman of the PLO. The election marked a new era. The guerrillas were in the ascendant, overthrowing the traditional hold of more established Palestinian families. Such was the impact of the PLO and the fedayeen that Arafat's image had made the cover of Time magazine. But it was in Jordan, the base for most of the Palestinian factions, where the fedayeen's growing assertiveness caused most problems. They had set up a state within a state in Jordan, and the actions they planned and carried out soon began to rock the region. Armed gunmen roamed the streets of the capital, Amman, and Jordan's other main cities like Erbid and Zalka. Palestinian guerrillas no longer restricted themselves to bases in the more inaccessible parts of the country. Complaints about Palestinian excesses quickly mounted.

Prince Hasan bin Talal: "Between 1967 and 1971, there were more than 30,000 cases of lawlessness, from the throwing of hand grenades to premeditated murder. There were even attacks against His Majesty the King. All of this was tolerated with tremendous patience by His Majesty, because I think he felt a certain responsibility for the events of 1967. To his dying days, he felt it, especially the loss of Jerusalem.

King Hussein may have felt for the loss of Jerusalem and the West Bank in 1967, but his patience with the Palestinians was beginning to wear thin. For their part, Palestinian figures to this day contend that dark forces were at play, determined to bring about a showdown.

Abu Daoud, Senior Fatah Leader: "To be honest, we were not saints in Jordan. We made mistakes, but these mistakes were made out to be sins. Jordanian intelligence used to create their own fedayeen organizations, whose role was to wreak havoc in the country. We apprehended one such organization, set up by military intelligence, with some 70 members. We deported them to Syria, and we later released them."

Bassam Abu Sharif, PFLP: "The revolutionary zeal of the Palestinians knew no boundaries. Radical leftist ideology could be seen sprayed on mosque walls. Private property was considered up for grabs."

Mamdouh Nofal Senior DFLP Official: "This leftist zeal, I call it their late childhood, manifested itself in the celebration of Lenin's birthday and delivering Marxist speeches from pulpits of mosques. It was an excuse for theft. Expensive cars would be stolen, and the excuse was that they belonged to the bourgeois classes."

"It was leftist immaturity. They were acts of provocation. The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine used to paint slogans such as, all power to the resistance. What does this mean? It means that the Democratic Front was working towards the overthrow of the Jordanian regime."

Tensions were rising on the streets of Amman. The dominant Palestinian faction, Fatah, attempted to distance itself from such excesses. But the Arafat could not, or would not, rein in the different factions and was unable to prevent the situation spiraling out of control. Groups such as the Popular Front and the Democratic Front were independent factions over which Arafat exerted little control. Things began to come to a head in July 1970 when Palestinian factions in Jordan staged massive rallies condemning President Nasser for accepting a peace plan submitted by U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers. Palestinian demonstrators shouted insults at Nasser. The Egyptian leader was furious.

Faroud Quaddoumi: Senior PLO Leader: "I went to Mr. Heikal and asked him what had happened. Nasser's aide Heikal said, What are you doing? The president is upset. You are swearing at us and using the radio station we provided you with in Egypt to do it. Then, Nasser received us in Alexandria. He said he had been pacing up and down for two hours trying to stop himself from saying anything that would hurt us."

With tensions increasing in Jordan, it was a bad time for the Palestinians to fall out of favor with Nasser. To this day, some Palestinians feel the Egyptian leader gave a nod and a wink to King Hussein of Jordan to punish the Palestinians.

Abu Daoud, Senior Fatah Leader: "That's true. He told King Hussein to twist our ear. But he didn't ask him to massacre us. And then, Nasser went to Marsa Matruh so he would not be in Cairo when things came to a head."

But the Jordanians were still in two minds about the course of action to pursue against the armed Palestinians in their midst. Prime Minister Wasfy Atal recommended a more conciliatory approach.

Natheer Rasheed, Head of Jordanian Intelligence: "I told him the Palestinians will not withdraw unless they are faced with a superior force. So Wasfy Atal said, "Are you dissenting? I said no, this is our recommendation based on the intelligence available to us. His Majesty then intervened and adopted my recommendation."

On September 6, 1970, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, or PFLP, forced the Jordanians' hand. It hijacked airliners belonging to Swissair and TWA and forced them to land at a disused runway in the Jordanian desert known as Dawson's Field. A third hijacking of an Israeli aircraft was thwarted mid-air with one hijacker killed and the other captured. The plane landed in London and the hijacker, Leila Khalid, was taken into custody. Then a PFLP member in Bahrain hijacked a British airliner and forced it to fly to Dawson's Field to join the other two hijacked planes. This spectacular act of air piracy was masterminded by a senior PFLP leader called Wadih Haddad.

The PFLP was born from the remnants of the Arab Nationalist Movement and headed by George Haddash. It adopted a revolutionary Marxist doctrine. Wadih Haddad was one of its co-founders. He had become a mastermind of airline hijacking. Beginning in 1968, Haddad had put his theories of revolutionary violence into practice by hijacking several Israeli and Western aircraft. But the multiple hijacking in 1970 was his most important feat to date. It required meticulous, even scientific, planning.

Bassam Abu Sharif, PFLP: "During the planning stages, Wadih had sent engineers and surveyors to Dawson's Field. They had returned with a recommendation that the runway could handle modern jets.

MAJOR (RET) MUHAMMAD SAMMAN, JORDANIAN ARMY: "Wadih Haddad spoke in sharp tone. He was obviously the man in charge. He told our chief of staff to pull the Jordanian troops back. He added that if we didn't comply, he would immediately blow up the planes within seconds. And he emphasized it in English by saying, "I mean it." I remember this clearly.

On September 12, the PFLP removed the passengers and blew up the planes. With his hold on power rapidly disintegrating, King Hussein formed a military cabinet to finally deal with the anarchy in his country. The cabinet included intelligence officer Adnan Abu Odi.

Adnan Abu Odeh, Advisor to Hussein: "When the military cabinet was formed on September 16, I became minister of information. Wasfi Tal told me I would be the principal negotiator with the Palestinians. He said we would scare them into coming to the negotiation table. He never said anything about driving them out of Jordan.

Prime Minister Wasfi Tal's conciliatory approach did not win the day. The Jordanian army had other plans and deployed in full force onto the streets of Amman and Jordan's other cities. Vicious street battles soon erupted between army troops and Palestinian guerrillas. Fighting for their lives, the fedayeen put up a stiff resistance in the face of a Jordanian army bent on exacting revenge for all the humiliations it had endured at the hands of the guerrillas. Casualties mounted, with the Palestinians estimating that around 4,000 people were killed, most of them civilians.

Abu Daoud, Senior Fatah Leader: "Civilians bear the brunt of urban warfare. We estimate that we lost around 950 fighters in Black September. And as for the civilians, Arafat exaggerates and says around 10,000 died. But the real figure is around 4,000 to 5,000 civilians killed."

In the region, Arab anger mounted at what was perceived as an attempt at liquidating the Palestinian liberation movement. Promises of military assistance to the Palestinians from Iraqi forces stationed in Jordan failed to materialize.

AHMAD SOUFI, ARAB LIBERATION FRONT: "The Iraqi forces stationed in Jordan were not there to assist the Palestinians. Their duty was to aid the defense of Jordan against Israel. They didn't let the Palestinians down.

While Iraq kept its forces out of the fighting, the rival Baathist government in Damascus sought to intervene. Syria mobilized its armed forces and sent them into Jordan to support the PLO fighters. However, Syrian Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad refused to provide air cover to the advancing Syrian armor.

King Hussein contemplated the unsavory option of requesting Israeli air support in a bid to beat back the Syrian advance.

WILLIAM QUANDT: FMR US NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL: "First, the Israelis agreed to mobilize their forces to get the Syrians' attention. And then that's all they did, actually. But they were ready to use their air force if requested. We managed to get the message back to them that the king doesn't want you to go in on the ground. We don't want you to. But mobilization's fine. Don't do anything until we say to. That is, get ready to act if necessary, but don't do anything. And as you probably know, this was a dramatic moment. King Hussein used his own air force. And Hafez al-Assad stood down the Syrian air force. He knew that the Israelis might go into action if the Syrian air force acted.

Mamdouh Nofal Senior DFLP Official: "I'm not sure what the determining factor was for Assad. Was it his relationship with the Jordanian regime? Was it internal power struggle within Syria? Or did it have anything to do with the threats he was getting from the Americans and Israelis not to intervene? He was aware of all of this. And he may have used the circumstances to his advantage. Because shortly afterwards he mounted a coup d'etat and came to power."

Assad's position at this time would be a precursor to his future split with Yasser Arafat. The Palestinians were now on the run. An Arab League delegation headed by Sudanese President Jafar Nimeri and including Kuwait's Defence Minister Sheikh Saad al-Sabah arrived in the Jordanian capital and managed to whisk a besieged Yasser Arafat out to Cairo.

FAROUQ QADDOUMI: SENIOR PLO LEADER: "The Arab delegation came to Amman. They dressed Arafat in Kuwaiti robes and smuggled him out. Sheikh Saad was a hero."

16:45

On September 27, 1970, Nasser brokered a ceasefire agreement, which was signed by Arafat and King Hussein.

The following day, Nasser died, leaving the Palestinians without their benefactor. Arafat and Hussein signed a further agreement regulating the presence of Palestinian fighters in Jordan. But some Palestinians refused to accept the deal.

The agreement collapsed, and in July 1971, King Hussein continued his attack. The Jordanian army overran the remaining PLO bases and positions, forcing the Palestinians to capitulate. Some Palestinian fighters chose to give themselves up to Israeli forces across the River Jordan rather than surrender to what they viewed as a grim fate at the hands of the Jordanians.

Henceforth, the Palestinians would term the events that led to their expulsion from Jordan as Black September. The PLO had held sway over large areas of Jordan. Now it was transformed into a broken movement in search of a sanctuary.

One of Fatah's leaders, Salah Khalaf, otherwise known as Abu Iyad, was determined that the PLO remain a force to be reckoned with, despite the defeat in Jordan. Abu Iyad gathered a group of us and said, you have to prove to the world that the revolution has survived. We must show the world the long arm of the revolution.

Abu Iyad announced the birth of a new group, which came to be known as the Black September Organization, taking its name from the conflict with Jordan. In November 1971, at an Arab Defense Ministers' Council in Cairo, Black September struck its first blow. The target was this man, Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi At-Tal, whom Palestinians accused of responsibility for their expulsion from Jordan.

Our group decided to assassinate Wasfi At-Tal by any means possible. There were four of us in the hit team. I was under the command of Abu Iyad and Abu Hassan Salam.

They ordered us to go to Egypt. It was Sunday, November 28, 1971. Three of us waited for Wasfi At-Tal in the lobby of the Cairo Sheraton.

As soon as he entered the hotel, we opened fire on him. We shot him 14 times. Then we gave ourselves up.

That was the plan. We were to kill him and then go to try to gain media exposure. The role that Yasser Arafat played in forming Black September and planning its operations has always been open to conjecture.

Today, Al Jazeera can finally reveal the truth. Arafat knew everything. He wasn't a guitar player.

He was the leader of the revolution. Abu Iyad used to act in concert with Arafat. When we were preparing for an operation in Jordan, Arafat came to our camp but didn't meet with us.

Then Abu Iyad came by helicopter and met with us while Arafat was in another room in the camp. He didn't want to meet with us, but later on he did visit us. The assassination of Tal was just the opening shot of the Black September organization.

A more dramatic operation was carried out the following year at an event chosen by the Palestinians because they knew the whole world would be watching. At the 1972 Munich Olympics, Black September operatives infiltrated the Olympic village, killing two Israeli athletes and seizing another 11 as hostages. The kidnappers demanded a prisoner swap and a plane to fly them out of West Germany.

Holding the hostages at gunpoint, the kidnappers were transported by bus to an airbase and then flown by helicopter to an airfield where two of them were shot dead by German snipers when they went to inspect the aircraft. German authorities claim another of the kidnappers then lobbed a hand grenade into the helicopter, killing all of the Israeli hostages. To this day, one of the principal planners of the operation remains unrepentant.

We were army officers. We killed army officers in sports clothes. The hostages were all army officers.

We killed only army officers who were dressed in sports tracksuits. The Israelis killed unarmed civilians. We did not murder children or unarmed civilians, but two months before Munich, the Israelis bombed a school, killing children.

So the world must have a more balanced outlook. Further acts of violence ensued, grabbing the world headlines. In March of 1973, Black September gunmen stormed a diplomatic reception at the Saudi Arabian embassy in Kharoum.

A siege ensued, which ended when the gunmen executed the American ambassador to Sudan, his deputy, and the Belgian chargé d'affaires. A declassified US State Department cable stated the operation was carried out with the full knowledge and authority of Yasser Arafat. The report also stated, One of the primary goals of the operation was to strike at the United States because of its efforts to achieve a Middle East peace settlement which many Arabs believe would be inimical to Palestinian interests.

By the end of 1973, the PLO leaders had decided that the Black September organization had outlived its usefulness. In the aftermath of the October 1973 war, a new political climate had emerged. Yasser Arafat now recognized that there was a limit to what military action could achieve and that the Palestinians must present an acceptable political program to the world if their liberation movement was to achieve its goals.

Defeat in Jordan and a series of headline-grabbing acts of violence had ensured the survival of the Palestinian revolution but damaged it in the eyes of the world. Arafat decided that from now on, the gun would only support but not supplant his political agenda. But this view was not shared by other Palestinian factions nor did it prove realistic as the PLO was soon drawn into a civil war in a neighboring Arab country.